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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, THE DEATH ROW PHENOMENON 
AND THE SUPREME COURT OF NIGERIA: ONUOHA KALU 
V THE STATE [1998] 12 S.C.N.J. 1
A. A. Oba
Senior Lecturer and Head, Department o f Jurisprudence and International Law, University o f
iiorin, iiorin
The issue of constitutionality1 2of capital punishment and some aspects of the punishment 
came before the Supreme Court of Nigeria in Onuoha Kalii v The State? This was the first 
time that the issue was properly raised in the Supreme Court. The full court (consisting of 
seven justices of the Court3) gave a unanimous decision affirming the constitutionality of 
the death penalty in Nigeria. This judgement was delivered in December, 1998.
A review of this case is now necessary and desirable for three reasons. One, apart from the 
issue of capital punishment being of international interest and concern, there has been a 
controversy surrounding the constitutionality of capital punishment in Nigeria since the 
enactment of the 1979 Nigerian Constitution.4 Arguments had been advanced that the 
Constitution has impliedly abrogated capital punishment in Nigeria.5 The case has now 
settled the legal point though the social controversy remains.6 Secondly, the issue of 
prolonged detention of prisoners under death sentences (the death row phenomenon) was 
raised but was not adjudicated upon by the court. The issue, particularly, the appropriate 
remedy for such victims. In cases from other jurisdictions, the death sentences were
1. This case was decided under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979. This 
Constitution has now been replaced by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. The 
provisions of the 1979 Constitution cited herein are in pan' materia with those of the 1999 Constitution. 
The corresponding sections are shown herein the footnotes.
2. [1998] 12 S.C.N.J. 1. See also (1998) 13 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 583) 531.
3. M.L. Uwais, C.J.N, S.M.A. Belgore, A.B. Wali, I.L. Kutuigi, M.E. Ogundare, E.O. Ogwuegbu, and A. I. 
Iguh, JJSC.
4. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979. Although this Constitution has been replaced 
by another Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, the provisions relevant to the article 
are in pari materia though the numbering of the sections in the 1999 Constitution may vary.
5. See: Nwabueze, The Presidential Constitution of Nigeria (1982) pp. 48, 412 and 441-2; Okagbue, "The 
Law and Human Dignity: Some Aspects of Inhuman and Degrading Treatment", (1985). Nig. Current 
Law Review 213; and Ikhiriale, "Death Penalty in Nigeria: A Constitutional Aberration", Journal of 
Human Rights Law and Practice, Vol. 1. No. 3/Vol. 2, Nos. 1&2, Nov. 1991-92, p. 40.
6. There has been a small but strong and vocal movement in the country against capital punishment. In 
addition to n. 5 above, see: Okagbue, "the Death Penalty From a Human rights Perspective", 1995 
Nigerian Current Law Review, 143. Okagbue, The Death Penalty as Effective Deterrent to Drug Abuse and 
Drug Trafficking: Myth or Reality? (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 1991); A. A. 
Adeyemi, "Death Penalty in Nigeria: Criminological Perspectives" in Bola Ajijola (ed.), Narcotics, 
Law and Policy in Nigeria (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Justice, (1990), 282 and in (1988 -91). Nigeria 
Current Law Review 1 andD. A. Ijalaye, "Capital Punishment: Quo Vadis Nigeria?", in I. A. Ayua, Law, 
Justice and the Nigerian Society — Essays in Honour of Justice Mohammed Bello (Lagos: Nigerian Institute 
of Advanced Legal Studies, 1995), 188.
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commuted to life imprisonment.7 There are important indications from the Supreme Court 
in the case that this may not be the remedy applicable in Nigeria to such cases. Thirdly, 
death row cases have now been filed in the high courts subsequent to and consequent 
upon the decision of the Supreme Court. There are strong indications that the ambit and 
scope of the Supreme Court decision has not been properly understood by some of the 
courts.8 There is therefore the need to articulate the arguments and the judgements in Kalu's 
case. These and further arguments that counsel could advance in the cases are examined in 
this article.
FACTS AND ISSUES IN THE CASE
The facts of the case are that the accused was on 6 March 1984, arraigned before the Lagos 
High Court on a charge of murder allegedly committed on 24 August 1981. On 30 July 
1985, the trial court found the accused guilty. The court imposed the mandatory death 
sentence prescribed for the offence under section 319 (1) of the Criminal Code of Lagos 
State.9 The accused lodged an appeal against his sentence and conviction to the Court of 
Appeal. The Lagos Division of the Court of Appeal on 7 June 1995 in a unanimous decision, 
dismissed the appeal, and affirmed the conviction and sentence passed on the appellant. 
The appellant further appealed to the Supreme Court.
The issue of constitutionality of death penalty was raised neither at the trial High Court 
nor at the Court of Appeal. However, Supreme Court, upon his application, granted him 
leave to raise the issue before the court. Thus with the leave granted by the Supreme Court, 
the two issues before the court now reads:
1. Was the Court of Appeal right in holding that the appellant was properly arraigned 
in accordance with the rule in Kajubo's case and, if not, should the appellant be 
retried or acquitted?
2. Whether section 319 (1) of the Criminal Code of Lagos State is not inconsistent 
with section 31 (1) (a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and 
therefore null and void and if so, whether the affirmation of the death sentence 
by the Court of Appeal was correct.
The first issue was resolved against the appellant. The Supreme Court held that his 
arraignment was properly conducted in the trial court. This issue is not part of our focus 
here. The second issue addressed the issue of constitutionality of the death penalty in 
Nigeria. This issue was divided into three sub-issues, namely,
1. Whether capital punishment is compatible with the provisions of the Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979,
2. Whether the mode of execution prescribed i.e. hanging, violates provisions of the 
Constitution, and
3. Whether the prolonged detention under sentence of death (i.e. the death row  
phenomenon) is a cruel and inhuman treatment under the terms of section 31 
which violates the 1979 Constitution.
7. Some are discussed later in this article.
8. See Sam Amadi, "Limiting Access to Court to enforce Fundamental Rights: Onuaha Kalu v. Attorney 
General of the Federation and or$", The Hurt-Laws Newsletter, A Quarterly Review of Human Rights Law 
and Practice, October-December 1999, pp. 11-13.
9. Cap 31, Laws of Lagos State of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1973, now Cap, 32, Laws of Lagos 
State of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1994.
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The issue of capital punishment is an important one that transcends national boundaries. 
Therefore, the case of Onuoha Kalu v The State, apart from having an important constitutional 
significance, is also one of immense international interest. The issues were extensively 
argued before the court. The appellant's counsel is a leading human rights lawyer, activist 
and a Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN). Apart from counsel to the parties, others including 
the Attorney General of the Federation and other prominent Senior Advocates filed briefs 
as amici curiae. As is now the case in novel human right cases, relevant authorities from 
jurisdictions across the world were cited and reviewed by the court. We shall now examine 
the relevant facts of the case and how the Supreme Court found its way through the maze 
of seemingly conflicting cases from different countries.
JUDGEMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT 
1. Constitutionality of Death Penalty in Nigeria
The main thrust of appellant's argument against the death penalty prescribed for murder 
in section 319 (1) of the Criminal Code of Lagos State was that the punishment violates 
sections 30 and 31 (1) of the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Therefore, 
the punishment is therefore invalid, null and void. The constitutional provisions111 relied 
upon are as follows:
Section 30
(1) Every person has a right to life, and no one shall be deprived intentionally of his 
life, save in execution of the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offence of 
which he has been found guilty in Nigeria.10 1
Section 31
(1) Every individual is entitled to respect for the dignity of his person, and accordingly -  
(a) no person shall be subjected to torture or to inhum an or degrading  
treatment.12
The Supreme Court held that the death penalty is constitutional under the Nigerian 
Constitution. Iguh JSC., delivering the lead judgement of the court described the position 
under the 1979 Constitution thus:
Under section 30 (1) of the Constitution, therefore, the right to life, although fully 
guaranteed is nevertheless subject to the execution of a death sentence of a court of 
law in respect of a criminal offence of which one has been found guilty in Nigeria.
The qualifying word save, used in section 30 (1) seems to me to be unmistakable key to 
the construction of that provision. In my view, it is plain that the 1979 constitution can 
by no stretch of the imagination be said to have proscribed or outlawed the death 
penalty. On the contrary, section 30 (1) of the Constitution permits it in the clearest 
possible terms, so long as it is inflicted pursuant to the sentence of a court of law.13
His Lordship holding that the provisions of the Constitution must be read together and 
not disjointly, further cited section 213 (2) (d) of the Constitution which makes provisions
10. The relevant provisions are in pari materia with those of the current Constitution.
11. See now section 33 (1), 1999 Constitution.
12. Now section 34 (1), 1999 Constitution.
13. A tp. 30.
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for appeals to the Court of Appeal in cases in which a sentence of death has been passed by 
the High Court and section 220 (1) (e) which provides for a further appeal to the Supreme 
Court where the Court of Appeal affirmed a death sentence. His Lordship described the 
effect of these provisions thus:
It is plain to me that apart from section 30 (1), there are also provisions of Section 213 
(2) (d) and 220 (1) (e) of the Constitution which, again, in no mistakable terms, recognise 
the death penalty as a form of sentence. I have also taken great care to go through the 
entire 1979 Constitution and have been unable to find any single section thereof which 
abolished or outlawed the death penalty. And I ask myself, having regard to the 
combined effect of sections 30 (1), 213 (2) (d) and 220 (1) (e) of the Constitution, whether 
it can be seriously argued as the appellant now appears to do, that section 319 (1) of 
the Criminal Code of Lagos State which prescribes the death sentence is inconsistent 
with Section 31 (1) (a) or, indeed, with any other section of the Constitution. I think 
not. To argue otherwise, if I may say with respect, will tantamount to embarking on 
an exercise aimed at defeating the clear provisions of the Constitution.14
The Supreme Court also rejected the contention of the appellant that the death penalty per 
se amounts to inhuman treatment. According to the court, the plethora of authorities from 
various jurisdictions cited to it on the issue falls into two categories — those upholding 
capital punishment and those rejecting the punishment. The crucial distinction between 
these cases, according to the Supreme Court, depended on whether the constitutions/ 
documents interpreted in the cases gave an unqualified right to life. Iguh, JSC, delivering 
the lead judgement said as follows:
Upon a careful perusal of the various foreign authorities to which our attention was 
drawn by the appellant, the opinion that the death penalty per se amounts to torture, 
inhuman and degrading treatment and, therefore, intrinsically unconstitutional seems 
to me a minority view. Indeed, a close study of those decisions reveals that the foreign 
jurisdictions that have similar provisions in their Constitutions as ours have repeatedly 
pronounced the death penalty to be constitutionally valid. The decisions tended to 
turn on the crucial question of whether the right to life therein contained is qualified or 
unqualified. If qualified, the death penalty was, in the main, held to be constitutional. If 
unqualified, however, the death penalty was, rightly in my view, declared to be 
unconstitutional.15
The views expressed in the lead judgement is unanimous. Other justices of the court read 
concurring judgements stating the same conclusions. The court held that the matter of 
abolition of the death penalty in Nigeria is not a matter for the courts but one for the 
legislature. They emphasised that the Supreme Court will not usurp the functions of the 
legislature by embarking on any exercise of judicial legislation.
14. A tp. 31.
15. At p. 31. The cases where the death penalty was affirmed because of the qualified nature of the right 
o life in the Constitution are: Mbushuu and Anor v The Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 1342 of 1994, 
decided on 3 1 /1 /9 5 , by the Tanzanian Court of Appeal); Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in 
Zimbabwe v Attorney General Zimbabwe and others [1993] (4) S.A. 239 (Supreme Court of Zimbabwe); 
Bacan Singh v The State of Punjab [1983] (2) SCR 583, the Supreme Court of India; Earl Pratt and Anor v 
Attorney General for Jamaica and others [1994] 2 A.C. 1, (Privy Council) and in America, the death 
penalty was held not to be intrinsically unconstitutional in these cases: Gregg v Georgia 428 US 153
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2. Mode of Execution and the Death Row Phenomenon
The appellant attacked the mode of execution prescribed, i.e. hanging as a cruel, inhuman 
and degrading punishment within the ambit of section 31 (1) of the Constitution. The 
appellant also raised the issue of his prolonged confinement under a sentence of death. He 
argued relying on Pratt v Attorney General for  Jamaica,™ that he had spent an unduly 
prolonged time in detention under a death sentence. This he submitted, constitutes a 
violation of section 33 (1) of the Nigerian Constitution which forbids cruel and inhuman 
treatment. He therefore urged to commute to life imprisonment, the death sentence imposed 
on him.
The Court held that it had no jurisdiction to pronounce on these issues since they do not 
arise within the present appeal. The issues arose not in the trial of the appellant, but after 
the conviction. They could only form the subject of another action for the enforcement of 
the appellant's fundamental rights in the High Court. The Supreme Court pointed out that 
this was the procedure adopted in the cases cited by the Appellant which were all civil 
cases filed in separate proceedings before their respective courts of first instance.16 7 In spite 
of the stance of the Supreme Court on these issues, there is much obiter from the judges of 
the court. The most significant is that of Belgore JSC, on the appropriate remedy for 
prolonged stay in the death row. His Lordship opined thus:
At any rate, if after the death sentence has been passed and the accused is in prison 
custody, if anything arises outside the normal custody that amounts to "torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment" that will be a cause of action under Fundamental 
rights but not militating against the sentence of death. In such a case, the death sentence 
stands, but a new cause of action has arisen and can be separately enforced and 
remedied. "Inhuman or degrading treatment" outside the inevitable confinement in 
the death row will not make illegal the death sentence; rather it only gives ground for 
an enforceable right under the Constitution.18
(1976); District Attorney for Suffolk District v fames Watsons and others [1980] 381 Mass. 648; furek v Texas 
428 US [1976] and Woodson v North Carolina 428 US 242 (1976). The Supreme Court distinguished 
these cases on the ground that the death penalty in these cases was set aside due to the qualified 
nature of the right of life in the Constitution considered therein: Jones Wittenberg 33 F. Supp 707 
(Constitution of Hungary) and The State v Makwamjane and another [1995] 6 BCLR 665 (CC), [1995] 
SACLR Lexis 218 (the Constitutional Court of South Africa). Another reason why the death penalty 
was declared unconstitutional in the case was on account of the arbitrary, discriminatory and selective 
nature of its exercise at all material times in South Africa (see Kalu's case at p. 333 per Iguh, JSC). The 
Supreme Court pointed out that in Furman v Georgia [1972] 408 US 238 (which was heavily relied 
upon by the appellant), the US Supreme Court held that the imposition of the death sentence under 
Georgian and Texas statutes constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and 
Fourteen Amendments, because under those statutes, the juries had untrammeled and irreconcilable 
discretion to impose or withhold the death penalty at will: see Kalu's case at p. 35, per Iguh, JSC.
16. Op cit. See comments on this case in Oba, A. A, "The Cruel and Inhuman Aspects of Delaying Execution 
of Capital Punishment: Pratt v A.G. for Jamaica", [1997], Journal of International and Comparative Lazo, 
Vol. 1, pp. 158-164.
17. Iguh JSC,at pp. 40-41 citing Earl Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica (op cit), Guerra v 
Baptiste and ords [1996] 1 A.C. 397 (PC), Riley v Attorney General Jamaica [1983] A.C. 719 (PC).
18. At p. 53.
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COMMENTS
(a) Capital Punishment
Since the advent of the 1979 Constitution, there has been much academic opinion to the 
effect that the provisions of the Constitution have impliedly abrogated the death penalty 
in Nigeria.19 The judgement of the Supreme Court in Onuoha Kalu's case has settled this 
matter. The judgement is no doubt in consonance with the provisions of the Constitution. 
Abolitionists will now have to focus their attention on the legislature.
Abolitionists have an uphill task in Nigeria. The views of the justices of the Supreme Court 
may well point to the dominant attitude to capital punishment in Nigeria. The views of 
Iguh, JSC, can be deduced from this statement of his:
. . .  Nor have I found myself able to hold that this court is entitled to repeal or revoke 
laws ostensibly based upon notions of public policy or sanction simply because such 
laws, for one reason or the other, are said to be unacceptable to a group of persons or 
a section of society.20
Wali JSC, expressed similar views:
The purport of section 30 (1) supra is that the death penalty is constitutionally  
recognised in the way and manner prescribed by law. It is not the function of the court 
to apply the canon of interpretation to invalidate a valid and legal legislation for the 
only reason that such a legislation is not in line with its social thinking or is not liked 
by a fractional section of the Nigerian people.21
Uwais CJN was content with putting it thus: "The position in Nigeria is very clear. Death 
sentence is a reality."22
Belgore JSC, puts his own views more forcefully:
Therefore, it is clear that much as the victim of a murderous assault was entitled to 
life, so also is the murderer liable to death for his deed.23 The Constitution recognises 
death sentence . . . Nigeria is not peculiar in its Constitution and provision of death 
sentence therein and in other statutes. Not up to ten per cent of the sovereign nations 
of the world abolished death sentence. Abolition of death sentence is not an indication 
of civilisation, rather in some cases it is based on historical circumstances of some 
countries. At any rate in this country, due to our Constitution, it is not the function of 
the courts of law to abolish the sentence of death, the responsibility is on the legislative 
body.24
The briefs filed by Dr Okafor San also opposed abolition of capital punishment. Of all the 
briefs filed in the case — and indeed many of them are excellent and well researched — his 












This echoes the Biblical and Quranic "life for life" approach. See The Bible (RSV), Exodus 21:24; Lev. 
24:17 and Deu. 19:21; and The Quran, 2:178, 5:48 and 42:40.
At p. 52.
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The abolition of the death penalty is a very weighty matter involving policy where 
decision should be a function of conscious and deliberate act of the highest policy 
formulating and law-making organ of the State involving, where feasible, the opinion 
of the people in a referendum. The eventuality of self-help and revenge killing in the 
wake of dismay and disillusion at the abolition of the death penalty should not be 
under-estimated.25
The above shows the obstacles to abolition of capital punishment in Nigeria. The case in 
question itself, that is Kalu’s case is really a poor argument for its abolition. It was a murder 
case. The appellant stabbed the deceased to death with a broken bottle. This type of murder 
is usually perpetrated by the most feared hooligans in the society. It is not a case in which 
even sentiment is in favour of the appellant.
However, section 31 of the Constitution is not totally relevant to capital punishment. The 
tests of cruelty and inhumanity are still applicable where the death sentence is prescribed 
for some categories of offences which normally are non-capital offences. As of today, capital 
punishment is prescribed for the offences of murder,26 armed robbery27 and treason.28 It is 
submitted here that although the legislature has the power to prescribe punishments for 
offences, it will be cruel and inhuman if they decide to extent capital punishment to, say, 
petty theft.
There is also the suggestion that public execution constitutes inhuman and degrading 
treatment.29 These are issues which can be raised when the opportunity presents itself.
(b) Is Hanging Inhuman?
The appellant also contended that hanging constitutes a cruel and inhuman treatment. 
This matter was not decided upon by the Supreme Court on procedural grounds. It is 
however doubtful that the Supreme Court will not decide this issue in favour of any 
appellant in the foreseeable future. The preponderance of judicial decisions cited in Kalu's
25. Quoted by Ogundare JSC, at p. 69.
26. Section 319 Criminal Code, (applicable generally in slightly modified forms in the Southern States of 
Nigeria, text in Cap. Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990); and Sections 221 (culpable homicide), 
227 (abetment of suicide of a child or lunatic), 229 (life convict attempting culpable homicide) and 
302 (brigandage with culpable homicide) Penal Code (applicable generally with slight modifications 
in the various states in Northern Nigeria, text in Cap. 89, Laws of Northern Nigeria, 1963). The 
modifications are significant in the northern state of Zamfara which has now adopted the Shari'ah as 
its basic law. The Shari'ah Penal Code which was passed by the Zamfara State House of Assembly is 
not at hand, but the Draft Shari'ah Penal Code (January, 2000) prescribes capital punishment for the 
following offences: Zina -  adultery and fornication when committed by a married Muslim (section 
128); rape (section 129); sodomy (section 131 (b)), incest (section 133 (b)); Hiraba —  robbery in which 
murder occurs but property was not seized (section 153 (c)); robbery in which murder was committed 
and property was actually seized (section 153 (d) -  death by crucifixion); intentional homicide (section 
200 (a)); death resulting in trial by ordeal (section 404); witchcraft and juju (section 406); possession 
of criminal charms (section 407); cannibalism (section 408); and unlawful possession of human corpse 
or any part thereof (section 409).
27. Section 402, Criminal Code.
28. Sections 37 (treason), 38 (instigating invasion of Nigeria) and 49A (treachery) of the Criminal Code 
These are also applicable to the northern states, see: the Penal Code (Northern States) Federal 
Provisions Act, Cap. 345, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990.
29. Aguda, The Judiciary in the Government of Nigeria (Ibadan, New Horn, 1983): at p. 172-173.
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case does not favour the appellant's arguments here. In Singh v The State of Punjab,30 1’ the 
Indian Supreme Court held thus:
By no stretch of the imagination can it be said that the death penalty either per se or 
because of its execution by hanging constitutes an unreasonable, cruel or unusual 
punishment prohibited by the Constitution.31
Again, in Catholic Commission for justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v Attorney General Zimbabwe,32 
the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe held that:
. . .  the constitutionality of the death penalty, per se, as well as the mode of execution 
by hanging, are also not susceptible of attack.33
Even, in Pratt and another v Attorney General for Jamaica3* the Privy Council held that under 
the terms of the Jamaican Constitution, hanging cannot be held to be an inhuman 
punishment for murder.35
Dr Okafor San also agreed with this view. He said thus:
It is only where the method of execution is so brutal or abhorrent or involves exorbitant 
or excessive pain that it can constitute torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. 
Hanging per se which is applied in Nigeria has not been shown to fit this qualification.36
The constitution also prohibits 'degrading treatment'.37 It has been suggested that hanging 
as a means of execution violates this clause.38
(c) Death Row Phenomenon
This is the second time the Supreme Court heard arguments but declined to adjudicate on 
this issue.39 However, the arguments on this issue are in favour of the victims of prolonged 
confinement on the death row. There is an overwhelming consensus in this regard. It is 
safe to assume that the Supreme Court will, without any hesitation, declare prolonged 
confinement under death sentence as a cruel and inhuman treatment which violates section 
31 (1) of the Constitution. Beyond this, it is difficult to predict. In Pratt's case, the Privy 
Council commuted the appellants' sentence of death to life imprisonment. It is doubtful 
whether the Supreme Court will adopt this approach. Belgore JSC, as seen in the passage 
earlier quoted, was clearly of the contrary view. This view is very important. And it is not
30. [1983] (2) S.C.R 583.
31. Quoted by Ogundare JSC, at p. 71.
32. [1993] (4) SA 239.
33. Quoted by Ogundare JSC, at p. 71.
34. Op cit.
35. Cited by Iguh JSC, at p. 37.
36. Quoted by Ogundare JSC, at p. 68-9.
37. Section 31 (1) (a), 1979 Constitution, now section 34 (1) (a), 1999 Constitution.
38. Certain forms of capital punishment might also be considered degrading, such as “hanging by the 
neck" until dead": Aguda, op cit., at p. 120-121.
39. In Peter Netni v The State [1994] 10 S.C.N.J. 1, although the issue was raised and argued, the Supreme 
Court declined to adjudicate on the issue because it was not properly raised before the Court, the 
procedural defect being that the issue was not included in any of the grounds of appeal filed in the 
case.
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a singular view. A similar decision was reached by the High Court of Rhodesia in Dhlamini 
v Carter No. 240 where Beadle CJ held thus:
If during the course of his punishment, a prisoner is subjected to inhuman "treatment", 
he can move the court for relief and the court will see that the treatment is stopped, 
but that does not affect the original "punishment" which cannot, itself be tainted with 
the inhumanity of the "treatm ent".41 42
The only remedy according to the court is that the delay be stopped! This case was overruled 
by the Rhodesian Supreme Court in the Cqtholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe's 
case where the death sentences passed on the appellants were commuted to life 
imprisonment. In the Indian case of Madhu Mehta v Union of India,42 the death sentences 
were also commuted to life imprisonment. According to Hatchard, commutation to life is 
the only meaning remedy possible in the circumstance.43
It is not likely that the Nigeria Supreme Court will go to the extreme of Dhlamini's case. It is 
more likely that damages will be awarded. The Supreme Court has had an occasion to 
award damages for violation of right to life. In Aliu Bello and ords v AG Oyo State,44 a 
convicted-armed robber sentenced to death was wrongly executed while his appeal against 
the conviction and sentence was still pending. The Supreme Court found that his right to 
life had been violated. The Court awarded damages of 7,400.00 Naira. It is likely the Belgore 
JSC, had this sort of remedy in mind.
One noticeable thing in Kalu's case is that Counsel for the appellant relied too heavily on 
foreign cases. It should be pointed out here that over the years, the Supreme Court indicated 
that in interpreting the provisions of the Nigerian Constitution, it would not embark on 
what it described as "a voyage of discovery" to foreign lands.45 Counsel should in future 
pay closer attention to provisions of Nigerian laws. Foreign cases many be alluring, they 
do not overawe the Supreme Court, as the Court's decision of capital punishment in Kalu's 
case shows. There are technical arguments in Nigeria against the remedy of commutation 
to life imprisonment. These should concern Counsel more than citing of foreign cases.
In human rights cases relating to the death row problem, the Supreme Court is not sitting 
on the substantive criminal appeal. Therefore the sentence would not be in issue. What 
will be in issue is the violation of the appellant's right to freedom from cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment.
40. [1968] (1) RLR 136.
41. Ibid, at p. 155.
42. Cited in Hatchard, op cit, at p. 317.
43. Hatchard, op cit., p. 315.
44. [1985] 5 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 45) 828.
45. In Nafiu Rabiu v The State (1981) 2 N.C.L.R. 293, Sir Udo Udoma, JSC, stated the position as regards 
foreign cases thus: "I might add that in my opinion, it is not a correct approach to proper interpretation 
of our present Constitution to begin by looking to the meaning or interpretation of a statutory provision 
of Constitution of other countries with different wordings. But of course, foreign constitutions or 
statutes with identical provisions accepted as in pari materia with the relevant provisions of our 
Constitution will naturally carry some weight in their persuasive influence, bearing in mind always, 
that even in such cases, circumstances may be at variance. (See Olaleke Obadara & Others v President, 
Ibadan West District Council Grade 'B' Customary Court, Iddo (1965) N.M.L.R. 39", at p. 327.
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Another problem lies in the fact that some offences carry mandatory capital punishment. 
If the Supreme Court has no power to vary such sentence when deciding that criminal 
appeal, how then can it claim to have that power in the subsequent human rights case?
Again, the court is functus officio as regards the sentence. A sentence of death affirmed by 
the Supreme Court cannot be judicially reviewed, even by the Supreme Court itself4(1 Under 
the Constitution, only the exercise of prerogative of mercy can tamper with the sentence 
passed on a convict after the appellate procedure has been exhausted.46 7 This power is 
constitutionally given to the executive.48 The 1979 and 1999 Constitutions are based on the 
American Presidential system which is based on separation of powers between the three 
arms of government, viz., legislature, executive and judiciary. The executive (like other 
two arms of government) are very jealous of their powers. The Supreme Court will definitely 
not want to make an incursion into the domain of the executive. In Pratt's case, Lord Griffiths, 
speaking of the position in England, acknowledged the executive role in the matter of 
commutation. His Lordship said:
It is difficult to envisage any circumstances in which in England a condemned man 
would have been kept in prison for years awaiting execution. But if such a situation 
had been brought to the attention of the court their lordships do not doubt that the 
judges would have stayed the execution to enable the prerogative of mercy to be 
exercised and the sentence commuted to one of life imprisonment.49 50
Another obstacle is the attitude and belief of the court. The Supreme Court has shown a 
clear bias in favour of capital punishment. Most of the judges of the court find nothing 
wrong with capital punishment. In fact, the judges have shown that they thought it necessary 
and even desirable in certain cases. They will certainly not allow the abolitionists to gain 
victory through the back door.
Again, the experiences from other jurisdictions are very instructive. When the death sentence 
of the appellants in Pratt's case were commuted to life imprisonment, the Jamaican 
government had to commute the death sentences of 105 other convicts who had endured 
similarly long periods of confinement.5" This action was met with a lot of criticism and
46. See sections 235 of the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions respectively which provide thus:. The "finality" 
of the decisions of the Supreme Court was enunciated in Adigun v Attorney Genera! Oyo State No. 2 
(1987) 4 S.C.N.J. 61 and Architects Registration Council of Nigeria, In Re: Majoroh v Pro). Fassassi (1987) 6 
S.C. 8. In Majoroh’s case the Supreme Court stated the position thus: "What are the powers of this 
court to review itself? Certainly, there are no Constitutional or statutory powers in this Court to 
review its order once a judgement is delivered. And so the powers could only be inherent. In other 
words, whatever jurisdiction we could be said to possess to review ourselves could onl v be inherent. 
And these we have fully considered in the Adigun's case... Before a Court finally determines a case 
placed before it, it is seized with jurisdiction whether or not it has jurisdiction. But, and this is of 
utmost importance, once the Court has finally determined the issue, it is functus officio. That judgement, 
if it is by a Court lower than the Supreme Court, can only be corrected on appeal. In the Supreme 
Court, the decision of that Court as far as that case is concerned is final for all ages. As I said in the 
Adigun No. 2 Case, it is final in the sense of real finality." It is final forever. Only a legislation ad 
hominen can alter it", per Eso, JSC, at pp. 10-11.
47. See sections 215 and 235 of the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions respectively.
48. See sections 175 and 212 of the 1999 Constitution.
49. At p.774.
50. Hatchard, "A Question of Humanity: Delay and the Death Penalty in Commonwealth Courts", (1994) 
20 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 309, at p. 315.
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considerable concern which is not surprising, given the high murder rate in Jamaica.51 The 
commutation of the death sentences of the appellants and 20 other condemned prisoners 
following the decision in Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace's case in Zimbabwe 
generated an intense debate. The government responded swiftly by passing the Constitution 
of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 12) Act, 1993 which provides that delay in execution and 
conditions under which prisoners are held will not lead to alteration of the sentence.52 
Thus in the death row cases now filed in the High Courts in Nigeria, counsel will have to 
labour to convince the court to grant commutation to life imprisonment as a remedy.
It would have been easy to agree with the position taken by Belgore JSC, but for the Nigerian 
situation. Cases are unduly prolonged at every stage of the criminal process. Apart from 
the interminable adjournment guarantee, cases take very long in the trial courts. The 
appellant system is no better. Delays above seven years between the date of conviction by 
the High Court and the final determination of the appeal by the Supreme Court are not 
unusual in capital cases.53 54If the Supreme Court merely awards damages to victims of the 
death row without commuting the death sentence to life imprisonment, it is doubtful 
whether the situation will improve. The Supreme Court should therefore consider the 
remedy of commutation in order to spur the executive to reform the criminal process. 
Mere award of damages will not have any real impact on the criminal process. In the first 
place, how much do you award for such suffering? The award of ridiculously low sums 
cannot be ruled out. The principles governing the award of damages in human rights cases 
was laid down by the Supreme Court in Minister of Internal Affairs v Shugaba54 as follows:
That in cases involving an infraction of fundamental rights of a citizen, the court ought 
to award such damages that would serve as a deterrent against naked, arrogant, 
arbitrary and oppressive abuse of power as in this case.55
The award of Three Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira (N350,000.00) as "compensatory 
and exemplary damages" by the trial court in the case would seem justified on the parameter
51. Ibid, p. 315.
52. Ibid.
53. Capital offences are generally unbailable in Nigeria. Therefore, apart from the slow appellate process, 
the period of detention pending trial and during the trial is also generally very long as these cases 
indicate: In Peter Neini’s case, op cit., the appellant was arrested on 9 /1 2 /8 2 , convicted on 2 8 /2 /8 6 , 
his appeal to Court of Appeal dismissed on 2 9 /3 /90 , appeal filed on 2 6 /4 /9 0 , and appeal was 
dismissed on 14/10 /94 . Appeals determined last year show the same trend: Idemudia v The State 
(1999) 5 S.C.N.J. 47, offence committed 19/11/85, appeal to Supreme Court determined 7 /5 /9 9 ; Sunday 
Ornini v The State (1999) 9 S.C.N.J. 1, offence committed 8 /10 /90 , appeal to Court of Appeal dismissed 
7/11 /95 , appeal to Supreme Court dismissed 24 /9 /99 . However, the latest reported cases show a 
marked improvement which point to a change of judicial attitude to capital cases in Nigeria: Richard 
Igago v The State (1999) 12 S.C.N.J. 140, offence committed 6 /7 /9 1 , appeal to Court of Appeal dismissed 
21 /12 /95 , appeal to Supreme Court dismissed 3 /12 /99 ; and Jonathan Igbi v The State (2000) 2 S.C.N.J. 
63, offence committed 2 5 /5 /8 6 , convicted 3 1 /7 /91 , appeal to Court of Appeal dismissed 1 7 /9 /98 , 
appeal to Supreme Court dismissed 11/2/2000. The next few appeals will show whether or not this 
is a definite trend.
54. (1982) 3 N.C.L.R. 915.
55. Per Karibi-Whyte at p. 928.
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stated by the Supreme Court.56 However, in this same case the Supreme Court more or less, 
deviated from these principles. In reducing the damages awarded by the trial court to Fifty 
Thousand Naira (N50,000.00) the Supreme Court said thus:
In my opinion, the sum of N50,000.00 is adequate compensation for the injury done to 
the respondent. The damages of (N350,000.00) awarded is to be paid from public funds, 
and the functionaries responsible for this injury will not bear any part of the burden.
It is not in the public interest that a citizen whose revulsion for naked and arbitrary 
exercise of executive power should bear in addition be made to bear such financial 
burden.
This decision has had a very adverse effect on the quantum of damages awarded in 
subsequent human rights cases.57
In Aliu Bello v AG Oyo State (supra), the appellant asked for Twenty Five Thousand Naira 
(N25,000.00) but Supreme Court awarded a mere sum of Seven Thousand Four Hundred 
Naira (N7,400.00). The Supreme Court did not place the proper value on human life in that 
case. It may be that the Supreme Court was influenced by the fact that the appeal in that 
case lacked merit. This cannot be the right approach. If the appeal had been a borderline 
case, would not the fact that the appellant had already been executed and the dire
56. Shugaba Abdulrahaman Darmatt v Minister of Internal Affairs (1981) 2 N.C.L.R. 459. The Applicant, a 
prominent politician was then the majority leader of the Bomo State House of Assembly. He was 
wrongfully deported from the country on the ground that he was not a Nigerian. There was no doubt 
that he was a victim of a carefully executed political intrigue and abuse of power by the federal 
government which was controlled by a political party different from the applicant's.
57. The decision has opened a flood gate of curious, sentimental and irrelevant considerations in the 
award of damages in human rights cases as the following two High Court decisions (unreported) but 
reproduced in the Journal of Human Rights Law and Practice, Vol. 4, Nos. 1,2,3, Dec. 1994 illustrate: 
Abdulahi and ors v The Attorney General Lagos State (at p. 285 of the Journal) where the applicants were 
detained for a period ranging from six to eleven years without trial. They claimed inter-alia, Fifty 
Thousand Naira (N50,000.00) each as damages. The court awarded them Ten Thousand Naira 
(N10,000.00). The Court stated the basis of the assessment thus: "I have awarded tfiis token 
compensation for a number of reasons: 1. The economy of the country is overstretched; 2. The 
compensation money is from the tax-payer's purse and affects every good citizen of this country; 3. 
To discourage any member in authority to watch his or her acts than to throw the country into reckless 
spending on account of unbridled and excess behaviours [the meaning is not clear, but, this is the text 
as reported in the Journal]; 4. To discourage any member of the public who might be inclined to 
pursue a bravado by putting himself or herself on the path of the law for a brush with the hope of 
financial gain; 5. And above all, to put every member of the society on the alert to obey and respect 
the law of the land" (Ibid, at p. 289); and Adeyemi and ors v The Inspector General of Police and ors (Ibid, 
at p. 290) where the period of detention of the applicants without trial ranged from three to six years, 
the court in awarding Ten Thousand Naira to the 1st and 5th applicants held thus: "In the light of the ' 
authority of Shugaba which the applicants counsel relied upon in claiming damages, it is not right 
that tax payers be made to pay excessive damages in such circumstances as the actual offenders who 
actually initially arrested and detained 1st and 5th applicants can no longer be traced. And even 
when they are found, they will not be made independently to bear any part of the burden. I award 
N10,000 damages to the 1st and 5th applicant each for the non-challant approach to the liberty of 
citizens exhibited by the officials concerned in the arrest and detention of both applicants" (Ibid, at 
pp. 300-301). In the case, the records of the 1st and 5th applicants could not be traced. It was not 
known which police officers arrested and detained them. They would have languished perpetually 
in custody if they had not brought the application for their release!
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consequences of allowing his appeal tilted the scale against him? One should have thought 
that it is a case that calls for the award of exemplary damages. Secondly, it is not likely that 
sums awarded to a condemned person can ever be claimed. Governments do not normally 
want to pay damages awarded against them. Bureaucratic obstacles by way of filling 
interminable forms and presenting documents will be employed to frustrate any ambitious 
heirs. Thirdly, the death row cases are different from wrongful execution as was the case in 
Aliu Bello's case. In Aliu Bello, the victim is dead and gone, but in the death row cases he has 
not. He is alive but deprived of his humanity in a daily anguish over his impending 
execution. This torture and suspense is worse than death.58
The Supreme Court should therefore realise that capital cases ought to be treated with 
expedition.59 Capital punishment has its responsibilities. One of them is the avoidance of 
unnecessary delays. A condemned person has the right to be put out of his misery as quickly 
as possible. This burden is on the government to discharge. Lord Griffiths aptly pointed 
this out in Pratt's case when His Lordship said:
In their Lordship's view a state that wishes to retain capital punishment must accept 
the responsibility of ensuring that execution follows as swiftly as practicable after 
sentence, allowing a reasonable time for appeal and consideration of reprieve.. .  If the 
appellate procedure enables the prisoner to prolong the appellant hearings over a 
period of years, the fault is to be attributed to the appellant system that permits such 
delay and not to the prisoner who takes advantage of it. Appellate procedures that 
echo down the years are not compatible with capital punishment. The death row  
phenomenon must not become established as a part of our jurisprudence.60
The Nigerian situation is worse. The delay has become inherent in the system. It does not 
require any effort on the part of the prisoner. But there is no valid reason for this. There is 
no reason why in Nigeria capital cases should not be given accelerated hearing. There 
should be a mandatory time limit within which the lower court should forward records of 
proceedings in capital cases to the appellant court.61
It is submitted that the Supreme Court has the power to commute death sentences in such 
circumstances to life imprisonment or any other term of imprisonment. This power is 
perhaps to be found in the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules,62 Order 6 
(1) of which provides that:
At the hearing of any application, motion or summons under these Rules, the Court 
or Judge concerned may make such orders, issue such writs, and give such directives
58. "Persecution is worse than slaughter": Quran 2:191 and 217.
59. The most recent reported appeals seem to indicate that the Supreme Court is addressing this problem, 
see: Richard Igago v The State (1999) 12 S.C.N.J. 140, offence committed 6 /7 /9 1 , appeal to Court of 
Appeal dismissed 21 /12 /95 , appeal to Supreme Court dismissed 3 /1 2 /9 9 ; and Jonathan Igbi v The 
State (2000) 2 S.C.N.J. 63, offence committed 2 5 /5 /86 , convicted 3 1 /7 /9 1 , appeal to Court of Appeal 
dismissed 1 7 /9 /98 , appeal to Supreme Court dismissed 11/2/2000.
60. At p. 786 of the judgement (op cit).
61. The preparation of the record of proceedings for the appellant court in capital cases is the duty of the 
lower court.
62. Statutory Instrument No. 1 of 1979, made by the Chief Justice of the Federation pursuant to the 
powers conferred on him under section 42 (3) of the 1979 Constitution (Now section 46 (3), 1999 
Constitution).
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as it or he may consider just or appropriate for the purpose of enforcing or securing 
the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights provided for in the Constitution to 
which the complainant may be entitled.
It has been argued and rightly too, that this Order has given very wide powers to the 
courts in respect of remedies for human rights violations.63 But what happens to the 
Constitutional provisions that gave to the executive the power of prerogative of mercy? 
When there is a conflict between the Constitution and rules made under delegated authority 
derived from the Constitution as is the case with the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement 
Procedure) Rules, there is no doubt that the Constitution prevails.64
Another line of argument is perhaps that since the Constitution does not specifically provide 
remedies for breach of the fundamental rights contained in the same Constitution, any 
remedy deemed fit by the courts must be taken as having constitutional force, moreso, the 
remedies provided under the Fundamental rules (Enforcement Procedure) Rules. It can 
also be argued that the Constitution leaves to courts to exercising their inherent powers as 
regards the remedies for breaches of fundamental rights. The Constitution recognises and 
preserves the inherent powers and sanctions of the courts.65 These powers include 
commutation to life imprisonment as illustrated by Pratt's case.
This and the other arguments highlighted above are the formidable arguments which 
Counsel to the appellant should prepare for when the death row phenomenon finally comes 
properly for adjudication before the Supreme Court.
(d) Procedural Matters
The Supreme Court was right to have declined to pronounce on issues of hanging and 
delay in execution. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in the appeal in Kalu s case relates 
to the criminal case. Its jurisdiction emanates from section 233 (2) of the Constitution which 
reads thus:
An appeal shall lie from the decisions of the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court as 
of right in the following cases:
(d) decisions in any criminal proceedings in which any person has been sentenced to 
death by the Court of Appeal or in which the Court of Appeal has affirmed a sentence 
of death imposed by any other court.
The post conviction human rights matters such as treatment of prisoners awaiting execution 
cannot properly form part of the criminal law issues envisaged by this sub-section. Human 
rights matters are civil matters which have procedures separate and distinct from the 
criminal procedure. What the appellant sort to do is tantamount to converting a criminal 
appeal into a first instance hearing of a civil case. A criminal appeal cannot be converted to 
a civil action. Again, the Supreme Court can only hear appeals in criminal and civil cases
63. See Chinonye Obiuagwu, "The All Powerful Order 6 Rule 1", Human Rights Neivsletter, January -  
March, 1998, Vol. 1 No. 2, p. 36.
64. Sections 1 (3) of both 1979 and 1999 Constitutions.
65. See section 6 (6) (a), 1999 Constitution.
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from the Court of Appeal. It is not a court of first instance in this sort of cases. The two 
issues raised are issues for another action at the High Court. This was the procedure adopted 
even in the cases relied on by the appellant. The Supreme Court was right to have insisted 
that the appellant go first to the High Court, then to the Court of Appeal before the issues 
can be heard in the Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
The case of Onuha Kaht v The State makes a very interesting and enlightening reading. This 
is due in the main to the plethora of judicial decisions from various jurisdictions across the 
world cited in the well-researched briefs at the disposal of the court. This reflects, no doubt, 
the international input that has become emblematic of human rights cases all over the 
world due to the activities of international human rights organisations.1* Counsel should 
however take note that in interpreting the provisions of the Nigerian Constitution the 
Supreme Court is more interested in arguments based on local statutes and case law. Foreign 
cases are used as persuasive authorities only, and even then, the statutes interpreted must 
be in pari materia with the local provisions in issue. Counsel should also take note of the 
procedural aspects of litigation. Many important human rights cases have failed solely for 
procedural reasons alone.6 7 This may be due to the novelty of the issues involved. It is 
hoped that the procedural pitfalls are now well known and will be avoided by counsel in 
future.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Kalu's case has settled the question of constitutionality 
of capital punishment in Nigeria. The abolitionists can only look in the direction of the 
legislature for reforms. From what has been discussed above, it will not be an easy task. In 
Nigeria, there is a strong support for capital punishment especially in homicide cases. This 
position is perhaps strengthened by cultural and religious factors that form a considerable 
influence on the outlook in the country.
The Supreme Court also indicated that hanging is not a cruel and inhuman manner of 
executing the death penalty. However, this issue is still open as it was not clear whether 
the Supreme Court considered the issue as part of the issues arising for determination in 
the case.
The legal consequences of prolonged confinement in the death row are also yet to be settled. 
Indications are that the Supreme Court will be reluctant to commute death sentences to 
life imprisonment. There are many legal arguments that can be advanced in support of 
that position. However, the issue is more moral that legal. It is hoped that the Supreme 
Court will look carefully at the implications of their perceived attitude. They should not 
take any stance that will perpetuate the death row phenomenon in the Nigerian criminal
66. For role of NGOs see Hatchard, op cit., p. 316, and Mohammed, "Individual and NGO Participation 
in the Human Rights Litigation Before the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights: Lessons 
from the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights" [1999], Journal of African Laiv Vol. 
43, 201.
67. For example: Fawehinmi v Gen. Abacha (case commenced under wrong procedure); Peter Nemi v The 
State, op cit, (death row issue not covered by any ground of appeal); and Ogugu v The State (1994) 9 
N.W.L.R. (Pt. 366) 1 (death row issue improperly raised on appeal without having been raised at the 
lower courts).
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process. Awarding damages is not the solution. The problem is one that need not have 
arisen. The solution lies in eliminating the factors that make the criminal process agonisingly 
slow. This should be of urgent concern to the present government, a democratically elected 
government, operating under a constitution that respects the rule of law and human rights.
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